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Jihad’s Relationship to Resistance
Jay Heidekat
Within Islamic belief, the call to jihad can be extrapolated to mean
many things; however, conceptual common ground can be found in the
classification of jihad as a struggle to improve one’s society or self. Within
marginalized social groups that are seeking to better their situation, this
struggle can manifest itself in the form of violent resistance or civil
disobedience. Resistance movements, like Hezbollah, are interested in
influencing their own government or ejecting the physical or indirect presence
of what the movement perceives to be imperialist hegemony. Depending on
the context from which the notion of jihad is propagated, it may require
something as simple as boycotting American goods. On the other hand, jihad
can be implemented to legitimate the use of violent resistance or even to
glorify and encourage suicide bombers—who are remembered as martyrs and
used to fuel the cause. To answer the questions of how resistance leaders
within Hezbollah justify these sometimes-violent actions, we must examine the
influential rhetoric of the Shiite cleric Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah.
Fadlallah clearly links the concept of jihad to resistance and describes
it as a most righteous and necessary struggle. In interviews he does not
attempt to separate the often-conflicting notions of nationalism and religion or
violence and virtue. In true dynamic, Islamist fashion, Fadlallah explains:
“Concerning violence, jihad in Islam is a defensive movement and a deterrent.
When God spoke to us about war, He said we should fight on behalf of the
weak, ‘And fight them on until there is no more persecution’ [Al-Baqara: 193].
1
Fight for the helpless, fight those who fight you.” In this statement, Fadlallah
attempts to describe, in broad terms, when violence should be used. The
important message is that jihad must be viewed as a defensive measure with a
religious backing. There is, however, flexibility built into the idea of “defending
the helpless” or “those who fight you” as will be seen later.
In general terms, Fadlallah promotes a stance of resistance towards
outside forces that provide obstacles to the Muslim world’s self-determination
and development. The cleric warns of the malignant influences from abroad
and preaches that, in the Middle East, there is a “situation where the foreign
powers, the great arrogant states, impose conditions on the people of these
parts of the world, like placing an iron necklace around their necks in terms of
2
economy, politics, knowledge….” Fadlallah is producing a discourse that
appeals to the post-colonized, marginalized people of the world while providing
jihad as a legitimate and justified form of action against an unfavorable
situation. In theory, the idea of resistance makes sense, but what form should
1
2

Fadlallah, Islamic Unity, 63.
Strindberg, Realities of Resistance, 32.

95
the resistance take? Under which circumstances does jihad constitute
armed resistance as opposed to civil disobedience?
In a recent essay, political sociologist Rola el-Husseini describes the
limits and uses of various forms of jihad as defined by Fadlallah and his fellow
cleric, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. She quotes Shams al-Din’s writing
concerning the versatility and focus of violent resistance: “Armed political
violence, violent political discourse and violent behavior vis-à-vis a foreign
invader or occupier is not simple political violence. Its legitimate defensive
jihad…. It is also a duty for the entire nation… Whether this jihad takes the form
of a regular war or that of a public or secret resistance or guerrilla warfare does
3
not impinge on its legitimacy.” El-Husseini describes Shams al-Din’s take on
resistance as a violent struggle against an imposing force. She goes on to deem
his preaching to be a nationalistic discussion steeped in the language of Islam.
This explanation describes the logic behind jihad, but in practice the
resistance can take two forms. The first is a struggle against an occupier, which
is known as a “defensive jihad.” This is a violent resistance that manifests in
skirmishes between two armed factions or the destructive martyrdom
operations of suicide bombers. This side of resistance is often what Westerners
perceive as jihad, or a holy war. The other form of resistance is a more passive
endeavor known as sumud—or steadfastness. It might literally mean to occupy
and hold a portion of land that had been previously liberated by the defensive
jihad, but it also can refer to sit-ins, protest, boycotts and other forms civil
4
disobedience. As the concept of resistance is fleshed out, it becomes clear that
it has the possibility be employed in many contexts to great effect. As motives
and opponents for a resistance movement may change over time, the focus
and form that the resistance takes may too transform, allowing jihad to remain
as a constant call to action and legitimizing mechanism.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 introduced a world of new possibilities
to resistance groups in the Middle East. The lesson gleaned from the rise of
Ayatollah Khomeini was that the Islamist paradigm could work in the face
authoritarian regimes and imperialist powers. Hezbollah itself was forged in
response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon of 1982. The movement
began as an armed resistance group formed to drive the Israeli presence from
their country and to provide support to the displaced and affected Shiites of
South Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah offered jobs, food,
medicine and other services to the marginalized Shiite population, who had
been dislodged from their homes and forced to live in the slums of Beirut. By
providing needed services where the Lebanese government had fallen short,
Hezbollah gained the loyalty of the Shiite masses. According to Martin Kramer,
“Hizbullah’s strength resided in its ability to harness a hundred grievances to
3
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one sublime purpose and to persuade its downtrodden adherents of their
5
own hidden strength….” Increasingly, it became clear that Hezbollah would
only see its goals of an Islamic state realized through resistance to Israeli
occupation.
In February of 1985, the group released a formal statement that
explained that the world is divided between the oppressed and the oppressors.
The United States was labeled the main oppressive actor because of its use of
Israel to bring suffering upon Lebanese Muslims. It goes without saying that
because of Israel’s encroachment upon Lebanese land, what came to be known
as “the Zionist state,” served as the primary outlet for continued, violent
resistance by Hezbollah. Clandestine military operations like car bombs and
suicide bombings against Israeli military installments as well as political targets
like the U.S. embassy in Lebanon became classified as terrorist activity by much
of the Western media. Conversely, many Lebanese viewed this violence as
defensive and warranted. The words of Fadlallah attempt to classify defensive
jihad as a perfectly viable approach, when used last a resort. He considers “the
call to jihad to be a call to protect the basic issues affecting human destiny from
those who are committing aggression against us. If someone fires a rocket at
me, I cannot respond by offering him a rose. From an Islamic perspective, we
6
compare violence to surgery: One only turns to it as a last resort.” It can be
taken from this quote that Hezbollah’s jihad is not about compromise; it is
about taking back what was taken away, by any means necessary.
This philosophy has produced a long series of violence between Israeli
forces and Hezbollah over the years. Between 1992 and 2000, the war of
attrition in Southern Lebanon embodied many examples of defensive jihad,
including suicide bombings of Israeli military installments in occupied Lebanon.
One specific string of tit-for-tat violence between the two countries began in
1996 when Hezbollah launched waves of rockets at northern Israel in response
to the deaths of Lebanese civilians. Israel’s next move was a counter-attack—
Operation Grapes of Wrath. What ultimately came from this was the Qana
massacre, in which, Israeli forces in the South of Lebanon slaughtered
Palestinian refugees. This event galvanized a more unified oppositional stance
7
towards Israel among Lebanese Muslims as well as Christians.
In this instance, as will be shown in others, the back and forth
between Lebanese resistance and Israeli aggression and vice-versa worked
favorably into Hezbollah’s discourse surrounding resistance. Any violent
aggression perpetrated upon the Israelis occupying Lebanon was seen a
contribution to the cause of Islam and to the defense of the oppressed. At the
same time, violence towards the Lebanese or Palestinians by Israelis simply
5
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created more venerated martyrs and fueled the fires of resistance.
Ultimately, both increased the support of Hezbollah and further demonized
Israel in the eyes of the Lebanese. Thus, there appears what I will call a cycle of
resistance, where opposition to Israeli domination, even when it results in
deaths on of the resistance side, can be used constructively to encourage unity
and fervor among the “oppressed.” In addition, any individuals killed become
“blessed martyrs” and symbols of further resistance. Hezbollah continues to
use this strategy in their rhetoric.
In 2008, a car explosion in Damascus resulted in the death of a
Hezbollah operative named Imad Mughniyah. Hezbollah’s authorities identified
the operative as a leader in the resistance against the Israeli occupation forces
in South Lebanon. After establishing this, the representative of Hezbollah made
a call for Lebanese national unity in the face of “Lebanon’s main enemy,
represented by Israel, which is accused of carrying out this treacherous
8
operation.” The death of Mughniyah was divisively used as an opportunity to
demonize Israel. In addition, Islamist authorities rallied around the
assassination, by extolling Mughniyah’s ‘“jihad’ and ‘sacrifices’ and [by] calling
on Hezbollah’s leadership ‘to respond to this treacherous operation by dealing
9
a painful blow to the Zionist entity.’” Fadlallah himself commented on the
assassination and capitalized on this opportunity to publicize the cause of
resistance in the wake of the tragedy saying, “we look forward to seeing all
arenas of resistance against the occupation more determined to confront the
enemy, more solid in the faces of challenges, and more committed to the
Islamic jihad line that seeks to move the nation from the stage of defeats to the
10
stage of victories.” The statements surrounding the death of Imad Mughniyah
illustrated that Hezbollah’s clever use of the cycle of resistance continues to be
profitable in terms of gaining support for the party and for condemning Israel.
Even in the group’s early history, Hezbollah was a dynamic entity.
Armed resistance went hand-in-hand with civil service and the dire situation in
Lebanon provided many chances for Hezbollah to reach out to the community.
Focused mostly in the affected South of Lebanon and Beirut area, the
movement built orphanages that provided refuge to about two thousand
children. In addition, schools were built to cater to the displaced Shiite
community, including schools for the blind and deaf. Hezbollah constructed
cultural centers and hospitals which all created reliance and trust towards
Hezbollah and its discourse of oppressed and oppressors. This community
reliance, coupled with Hezbollah’s military successes made Lebanese politics
the next goal for the resistance group. In a 1995 interview, when asked about
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the group’s future in the political arena or the possibility of participation in
the Lebanese parliament, cleric Fadlallah said the following:
“[Hezbollah] has amassed expertise in military, security,
cultural and political affairs, which greatly enhances its
chances of spreading its influence in Lebanon, despite the
challenge from the international American-Israeli campaign
against it. It would be very difficult to terminate the role of
Hizballah, because that role has strong grass-roots support
and is furthermore well grounded in its structure,
11
methodology, thought and political activities.”
Since this statement, Hezbollah has participated in all the country’s legislative
and municipal elections. The party won 14 seats in the national legislature in
the 2005 elections. Thanks to strategic alliances with other parties, Hezbollah
gained a reasonably sized voting block of 35 parliamentarians and, for the first
time, a seat in the cabinet. This newfound political influence did no hinder the
party’s underlying discourse of resistance. The transition to politics was always
perceived as being bourn out of the resistance as well as being an act
resistance in itself. Even in 1985, in the early stages of the movement, long
before any political involvement to speak of, Fadlallah said, “the spirit driving
the resistance is beginning to intensify and grow from being simply a combat
12
state of mind into a political and ideological state of mind.” The concept of
resistance as a driving ideology continued to gain Hezbollah support while
defining the statements and actions of the party.
Today, Hezbollah remains armed because of its refusal to comply with
the UN’s orders for disarmament. Hezbollah is not content with simply filling a
political role and wishes to keep resistance against Israel a reality. By defying
the wishes of the UN (an act of resistance in itself), Hezbollah hopes to remain
Lebanon’s vanguard against foreign invasion and imperialist pressure. When
pressed about Hezbollah’s continued armament, party leader Hassan Nasrallah
clarified, “Resistance is a reaction against aggression. When the aggression
13
ends, resistance ends.” As long as Hezbollah perceives Lebanon as a victim of
foreign interference, it will remain a beacon of resistance.
As Hezbollah gains more influence in Lebanon’s parliament, the
importance of resistance has only grown. Approaching the elections in 2009,
speaker Nabih Berri said, “Resistance, liberation and development will be the
choice of the Lebanese towards a better country and better life.” Although
liberation and development have been added to the agenda, resistance is still
11
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first on the list. He went on to explain, “The choice of resistance is a vital
national necessity as Israel continues to occupy a part of our land and to violate
14
Lebanon’s airspace, boarder and territorial waters.” Despite Hezbollah’s
drastically evolving role over the past 30 years, the primacy of resistance has
remained a key aspect in the party’s speech and philosophy.
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